Legal Goatbeagle

When I used to edit astrophysics articles, I picked up an odd and likely useless assortment of facts and factoids about astrophysics. Now, in my new job as a proofreader of court decisions, I'm picking up some interesting things about the law:

1. I learned the following words or phrases: cicerone (n: a guide for sightseers), ambit (n: sphere of influence), parol (n: something stated, adj: given by word of mouth), laches (n: negligence in observation of duty, specifically undue delay in asserting a legal right or privilege), contumacious (a: stubbornly disobedient), and in medias res (adv: thrown into the middle of a sequence, as in a narrative).

2. I learned that I unwittingly demonstrated an understanding of statutory interpretation when I was a kid: "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius" means "expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." My mom would say "Don't set the house on fire while I'm away," and I'd follow the letter of the law and dutifully not set the house on fire. Of course, she didn't say I couldn't do back-flips on her bed or jump off the roof like Superman, which means they must have been acceptable because they weren't on the banned list.

3. I learned that watches can be enemies of the people. In 2004, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals heard an unusual case. The plaintiff was the United States of America. The defendants were 2,164 watches, more or less. Really. The case was United States v. 2,164 Watches, More or Less, Bearing a Registered Trademark of Guess?, Inc. 366 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2004). What on earth could it have been about? Why "more or less"? Were they moving too fast to count? I have no idea. I could look it up, but I'd rather not. Instead, I relish comedy routines in my head of the courtroom scenes.

4. I learned that under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), an alien can be deported for any admission or conviction for a violation of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 802), other than, specifically, a single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana. Now, in some states, possession of drug paraphernalia is a felony, and as such, is considered a "crime of moral turpitude" under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), and is grounds for deportation. In summary, an alien cannot be deported for possessing marijuana for personal use, but can possibly be deported for possessing a pipe to smoke it in.

Update: Apparently the Supreme Court read my blog, because today they decided that minor drug offenses that are felonies under state law but misdemeanors under federal law are not grounds for deportation.

5. Can a police officer stop you on the street and demand to see your identification? Well, it depends. Terry v. Ohio (1968) says that a police officer can stop people on the street and search them if he or she can "point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant an intrusion." Michigan v. Long (1983) clarifies, saying that such a search is acceptable if "a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." Then Hiibel v. 6th District Court of Nevada (2004) says that states can statutorially authorize the demand for identification during a so-called Terry stop (after Terry v. Ohio) and can also require compliance with that demand. It's up to the states to decide if there will be penalties for refusing such a "reasonable" and "prudent" demand by an officer. In Illinois, you can be arrested for obstructing an officer for refusing to present ID, under 725 ILCS 5/107-14 (2006). So the answer is, it depends on where you live.

6. Finally, I learned that during jury selection, if a prosecutor strikes a potential juror for reasons the defense suspects are race-related, the defense can challenge the strike. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), outlines the process of the challenge. (1) The defense must establish a prima facie (apparent, on the face of things) case that the strike was race-related. (2) The prosecutor must present a race-neutral reason for the strike. (3) The judge assesses the credibility of the prosecutor's assertion. As summarized in United States v. Montgomery, 210 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 2000): "The ultimate inquiry is not whether the counsel's reason is suspect, or weak, or irrational, but whether counsel is telling the truth in his or her assertion that the challenge is not race-based." Meaning, even if the judge thinks the strike was in fact race-based, he or she can only judge whether the person doing the striking thinks it was race-based.

Warning: This should not be considered legal advice. Goatdog is not a lawyer, barrister, counsel, soliciter, advocate, attorney-at-law, jurist, jurisprudent, legal adviser, legist, counsellor, or procurator; he is not licensed to practice law or give legal advice in Illinois, Florida, New York, Ohio, or any of the rest of the 50 United States, including the District of Columbia. This is presented in a "hey, isn't this neat?" manner, not a "you'll hear from my lawyer" manner. If you get arrested and begin a sentence with "But Goatdog said," they will laugh at you and throw you in the chokey.